






UCD CENTRE  FOR  ECONOMIC  RESEARCH 
 





             
 
             Caps on Political Contributions, 
           Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences 
 
           Ivan Pastine, University College Dublin and 
              Tuvana Pastine, National University of Ireland Maynooth  
                       










UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 









 Caps on Political Contributions, 





National University of Ireland Maynooth
Abstract
With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary
penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In
contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral
on the expected cost of contributions nor on the policy outcome. Furthermore more restrictive caps
can lead to increased aggregate contributions. When the penalty for exceeding the cap is small
enough that it is impossible to suppress all contributions, the influence of money on policy is
minimized with a binding but non-zero cap and maximized with no cap.
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County Kildare, Ireland.  Email: Tuvana.Pastine@nuim.ie1According to Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) “because it costs so much to run for office, interests with big money to
contribute to candidates or spend on ad campaigns are able to get special access in Congress.” Senator John McCain (R-AZ)
argues:“Americans believe that political representation is measured on a sliding scale. The more you give the more effectively you
can petition your government.”(Quoted on the Senators’ web sites, March 2008). Politicians are forced to raise ever-increasing funds.
In 2008 the average cost of a successful campaign for the House of Representatives was $1.3 million, which represents a real increase
of 53% in a decade. Over the same period the average cost of a winning Senate campaign increased by 21% in real terms to $6.5
million. For summary statistics see the web sites of the Campaign Finance Institute and the Center for Responsive Politics,
www.cfinst.org and www.opensecrets.org respectively.
2It is well documented that institutional contributors appear to be acting as rational investors (see for instance Kroszner
and Stratmann (1998) and  Snyder (1990)) and special interest groups lobby members with positions of power in congressional
committees more heavily, see Ansolabehere et al. (2003) for a literature survey.
3The act limits an individual’s contributions to a candidate to a maximum of $2,300 per election and to a political action
committee to a maximum of $5,000 with built-in increases for inflation. See  http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml
for details. For state-level offices individual states are in charge of their own campaign finance regulations. All states except for
Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Virginia have contribution limits. Details on various state level contribution limits are
provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures, www.ncsl.org. A number of other counties also have contribution limits.
Examples include France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Taiwan and Turkey. See www.aceproject.org.
4The landmark Supreme Court ruling on Buckley v. Veleo argues that the Constitution affords the broadest protection to
political expression in order to assure the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.” Opponents of limits on political contributions frequently point to Chief Justice Berger’s dissenting opinion
extending this argument on campaign spending to political contributions.
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A basic premise of representative democracy is that people elect representatives who either share
their policy preferences or are willing to act as if they do in order to be reelected. In either case it
is likely that politicians have preferences over policy alternatives. However it is often argued that
the need to raise money to run a political campaign may weaken the connection between politicians’
policy preferences and the actions of politicians, undermining this fundamental premise of
representative democracy.
1 The concern is that politicians’ need to raise funds may lead to large
contributors having undue policy influence.
2 In order to achieve a “Reduction of Special Interest
Influence” (Title I of Public Law 107-155, 107
th Congress) the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Bill) re-regulates campaign contributions. It sets
clear limits on individuals’ contributions to candidates and to political action committees.
3
On the other hand, it is also suggested that contributions themselves may help politicians
learn about agents’ valuations of alternative policies. In this view it is important not to restrict
contributions because they contain information about the social changes desired by the people.
4 This
paper does not take sides in this debate, but rather provides a positive analysis of the effects of a
contribution cap where the incumbent politician has a policy preference and his policy choice may
be swayed by political contributions. The previous literature examining the effect of contribution5See www.fec.gov for details. In January 2009 the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice put in a request to
change the practice of administrative penalties being imposed by the FEC without Justice Department input. The Justice Department
asks that the FEC review the memorandum of understanding between the departments with a view to permitting the inclusion of a
US Attorney in the FEC’s decision whether or not to forward cases for possible criminal prosecution.
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caps on lobbyists’ ability to buy political favors analyzes the implications of a contribution cap under
the assumption that the politician is indifferent between the policy positions of the lobbyists. 
A seminal paper by Che and Gale (1998) shows that a rigid cap on political contributions can
have the unexpected consequence of increasing contributions. A restrictive cap can level the playing
field, resulting in more intense competition between lobbyists. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006),
henceforth KW, analyzes the effect of a cap in a more realistic setup where it is possible to give
more than the specified limit albeit with a risk of being caught. If the contribution cap is non-rigid,
not only does the Che and Gale (1998) result disappear, but a cap is completely neutral on lobbying
costs and on the outcome of the competition. Exceeding the cap comes at a cost, resulting in a kink
in the cost of contributions. But the cap does not alter the relative strengths of the lobbyists, so it
does not change the intensity of their competition. Gale and Che (2006), henceforth GC, further
refines KW and shows that the original Che and Gale (1998) result can still hold if the punishment
for violating the contribution cap is non-monetary (such as jail time) and lobbyists initially have
asymmetric costs. But if the punishment is monetary, contribution caps are completely neutral on
lobbying costs whether the cost functions are asymmetric or not (GC Proposition 1, Corollary 1).
In the United States monetary penalties for violation of contribution limits are the norm.
While Sections 312-315 of Title III, Public Law 107-155, 107
th Congress allow criminal prosecution
of violators, in almost all cases violations are handled as a purely administrative matter by the
Federal Elections Commission and only the civil penalties under section 315 are used. From 2003
through 2008 the FEC imposed penalties in 600 cases imposing fines totaling $18,641,360.
5
Together with KW/GC this suggests that under the current enforcement regime the policy discussion
about the effect of contribution limits on lobbyists’ ability to buy political favors is a red herring:
Unless criminal penalties are enforced contribution limits have no effect on lobbying costs or the
policies that politicians enact.6There is extensive empirical evidence indicating that the policy position of the politician is an important
determinant of politician behavior. Of the 36 empirical papers which study ideology or party affiliation surveyed in
Ansolabehere et al (2003), all but one find policy position significant for predicting congressional roll-call votes.
- 3 -
In this paper we revisit the discussion of monetary punishments for violating a contribution
cap by introducing politician policy preferences into the KW/GC framework.
6 We show that with
politician preferences contribution caps are never neutral on expected lobbying costs, even with
purely monetary punishments. Moreover we recover the original Che and Gale (1998) result that
contribution limits may intensify competition between lobbyists resulting in increased expected
levels of contributions.  
Even when the cost functions of the lobbyist are identical, we show that a non-rigid cap does
not have a symmetric effect on the lobbyists when the politician has a policy preference. The
lobbyist with the unfavored policy alternative must contribute more than his rival to overcome the
preference of the politician. Hence starting from a non-binding cap making the cap more restrictive
imposes a cost on the unfavored lobbyist before it imposes a cost on the lobbyist with the favored
policy position. This tilts the playing field in favor of the lobbyist with the preferred policy position
which can induce more aggressive competition leading to higher contributions and costs. 
The introduction of politician policy preferences allows us to broaden the discussion of the
effect of contribution caps beyond the expected level of contributions. We examine an additional
metric for the degree of influence of political contributions on policy: The probability that the
politician does not make the policy decision that he would have made in the absence of political
contributions. The choice of measure matters. With policy preferences a cap may lead to increased
aggregate contributions while at the same time making it more likely that the politician enacts his
preferred policy, reducing the influence of lobbying effort. We show that the influence of political
contributions on policy is at its minimum with a binding but strictly positive cap on contributions
for any set of parameter values where it is not possible to completely suppress all political
contributions. In addition, for all sets of parameter values we show that any binding contribution cap
will reduce the influence of political contributions on policy compared to no contribution limits. In
addition we show that contribution caps may redistribute political contributions from Senators and
politicians from large or urban districts to Representatives and politicians from smaller or rural
districts.7The all-pay auction without a cap has been analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1993, 1996). The results
in Siegel (2009) are applicable with or without a cap. See Yildirim (2005) for a contest where players have the flexibility to add to
their previous efforts and see Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2002) for a model where the size of the reward is a function of the bid.
8Konrad (2002) analyzes an all-pay auction with additive preferential treatment, equal bidder valuations and no cap. We
extend Konrad (2002) to allow bidders with different valuations and introduce a contribution cap.
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I. Model
Two risk-neutral lobbyists compete for a political prize. The prize will be arising due to a policy
choice of a politician who holds a political post. The prize may be a vote on impending legislation
but may also be more subtle, such as attaching a rider to an upcoming bill creating a regulatory
loophole, or pushing a particular wording in committee. The value of the political prize to lobbyist
1 is denoted by v1, and the value of the prize to lobbyist 2 is v2, v1 >v2 >0. The lobbyists make
simultaneous contributions, x1 and x2, to the politician in power. The contributions are not returned
to the lobbyist whose efforts fail. If lobbyist 1 wins the prize, his payoff is v1-c(x1) where c(x1) is the
cost of contributing x1.  If the rival wins, lobbyist 1’s payoff is -c(x1). Lobbyist 2 has an identical cost
function and his payoffs are constructed in the same manner. Since the contributions are sunk both
for the winner and the looser, this political lobbying game is an all-pay auction.
7 
The politician has a preference over the policy alternatives supported by the two lobbyists.
The politician’s preference may be ideologically based or it may be induced from the preference of
the constituents who will be voting in the future. The interest groups lobby the politician and the
politician awards the political prize based on the contributions and his preference.  The  intensity of
the preference for the policy position of lobbyist 2 is put into monetary terms, denoted by
 For example   could represent the expected future campaign costs required to offset (, ) .    
the effect of taking a policy position that is unpopular in the politician’s district.  If the politician
favors lobbyist 2’s position, γ>0.  If the politician favors lobbyist 1’s position, γ<0. The politician
awards the prize to lobbyist 1 if x1>x2+γ. In case of a tie, each contestant has an even chance of
winning the prize.
8 The rules of the game, the valuations of the lobbyists and the preference of the
politician are common knowledge.
Simple backward induction in the one-shot game that is analyzed here would have the
politician taking his preferred action regardless of contributions since all contributions are sunk.
Hence there would be no contributions. Thus implicitly we are assuming that this one-shot game is9The effect of a rigid cap (where the lobbyists cannot exceed the specified contribution limit,  ) with politician a 
preferences is analyzed in Pastine and Pastine (2008).
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embedded in a repeated setting so that the politician has an incentive to reward high contributions
in order to keep them coming in the future. However, as long as contributions, preferences and
actions are common knowledge among lobbyists, the same lobbyists do not necessarily need to be
involved in repeated contests.
Both lobbyists have an identical constant marginal cost of raising funds, normalized to one.
If the lobbyist exceeds the cap, in expectation he pays a monetary fee of   where m0[0,4) () ax m 
is the contribution cap and  .
9 Hence the expected cost of making a political contribution 0 a  










x ax m x m
 
    
As in KW and GC the cost function is continuous in x. Section 315 of Title III, Public Law 107-155
specifies that violations will incur a fine which is “not less than 300 percent of the amount involved
in the violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1000 percent of the amount involved
in the violation.” Thus under the current legislation if a violation is caught with certainty the relevant
a is between 3 and 10. If there is a chance that the violation will not be caught the relevant a is
correspondingly lower.
It will prove useful to define   as the maximum contribution the lobbyist would ever be i x













   
   
It is possible to write the equilibrium strategies more concisely if we define f as the lobbyist whose
policy is favored by the politician and u as the lobbyist with the unfavored policy.  So if γ>0, f=2 and
u=1, while if γ<0, f=1 and u=2. It will also prove useful to define the “Advantaged” lobbyist, A, as
the lobbyist with the highest reach: A is the lobbyist who can have a positive payoff by outbidding
his rival even if his rival is bidding her maximum willingness to contribute. So lobbyist u is the- 6 -
advantaged lobbyist if   and lobbyist f is the “Disadvantaged” lobbyist D. Similarly, uf xx 
lobbyist f is the advantaged lobbyist if  , f=A and u=D.  fu xx 
II.  Equilibrium
If the preference of the politician is too strong, vu #|γ| even if the favored lobbyist makes no
contribution it would not be worthwhile for the unfavored lobbyist to compete. Hence when γ#-v2
(u=2) or γ$v1 (u=1), equilibrium is only in pure-strategies where neither lobbyist contributes. 
If the preference of the politician is not too strong,   it may be possible to     21 ,0 0, vv   
suppress all competition with a sufficiently restrictive cap provided that the penalty for exceeding
the cap is high enough. The lobbyist with the unfavored policy position must contribute at least |γ|
in order to have a non-zero chance of winning. Competition is completely suppressed if the cost of
contributing |γ| meets or exceeds the value of winning the prize for the lobbyist with the unfavored
policy position:  . Solving for the highest m that can suppress all contributions: || ( || ) u am v   







m* is positive when the punishment for violating the cap is is large enough,  .  || / || u av  
If m*$0 then for all m#m* competition is completely suppressed. In this case neither lobbyist
contributes and the political prize is allocated to the lobbyist with the favored policy alternative. If
m*<0, competition cannot be completely suppressed no matter how restrictive the cap may be. There
will be competition for the political prize through political contributions even if all contributions are
banned. Proposition 1 below gives the equilibrium strategies for all  and    21 ,0 0, vv   
m>min(0,m*). Define the interval [b, c] as the empty set whenever b$c, and similarly define open
intervals. 
Proposition 1: For all  and m>m* equilibrium is only in mixed-strategies and    21 ,0 0, vv   
it is characterized by unique probability density functions Ff(x) and Fu(x) for the favored lobbyist’s
and the unfavored lobbyist’s political contributions, respectively. These distributions are continuous
in m. - 7 -
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Proof: Appendix A.10They survey 34 empirical papers and find that evidence on the effect of PAC contributions on roll-call votes is strong
in some policy areas but not in others. For instance, on issues relating to trade there is weak evidence of the effect of PAC
contributions on votes, but on issues relating to labor the evidence is very strong. 
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Proposition 1 completely describes the equilibrium for any set of parameter values where
there is competition between lobbyists and  . We can treat the no-cap case as m64. Equilibrium 0  
of this contribution game does not exist in pure strategies. The best response to a bid b! of the favored
bidder is either to outbid him by |γ| or to drop out of the race. In either case the favored bidder’s
choice of b! would not be optimal.
Since equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the unfavored lobbyist may end up contributing more
than the favored lobbyist but not by enough to overcome the politician’s preference |γ|. Consequently,
the empirical evidence on the effect of money on legislative action may appear to be weak. Indeed
in their survey Ansolabehere et al. (2003) find that the effect of PAC contributions on roll-call votes
is mixed.
10 Furthermore given that the preference of the politician would vary over policy issues, the
model is consistent with the fact that the evidence appears to be strong in some policy areas but not
in others.
 From the equilibrium distribution functions it is straightforward to examine the probability
that the lobbyist with the unfavored policy position wins, Probu, the expected total contributions,
E(Bids), and the expected total lobbying costs E(Costs).  To illustrate the forces at work, Figure 1
presents Probu, E(Bids) and E(Costs) as a function of the cap. Inflection points and kinks in the
graphs result from the existence or non-existence of kinks in the distribution functions. The figure



















order to present graphs with the richest results which permits a discussion of the intuition for all the
critical values of m. 
Given the degree of policy preference of the politician, there are five critical values for the
level of cap that determine the existence or nonexistence of kinks in the lobbyists’ equilibrium- 9 -
distribution functions:  . These critical values are derived and discussed below.  The *, , , , mm mm   
equilibrium implications are presented in the next section. But first it will be useful to define some
terminology. A “binding cap” is a cap which is lower than the maximum of the upper bounds of the
m
Probu
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. Proposition 1 (ii) applies when  mm   . mm  11In Proposition 1(i)   if  . In Proposition 1(ii) m i n ( || ,) || u mx m     (1 ) | | u mm v a    
 if   . m i n ( || , || ) || f mx m      2 mm v  
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no-cap equilibrium bid supports of the lobbyists. A “more restrictive cap” refers to a smaller m when
the cap is binding. 
 m* is the level of the cap that completely suppresses all competition, which is given by (3).
In the range of γ and a for which Figure 1 is presented,   and hence m*<0. So even (1 ) | | u va  
when all contributions are banned there is still competition over the political prize and therefore
Probu>0 at m=0.
denotes the level of a barely binding cap. It is equal to the maximum of the suprima of the m
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The cap is not binding when m> . An increase in m above  has no effect on the equilibrium of the m m
game and hence Probu,  E(Bids) and E(Costs) remain constant. 
is the third critical value. When  the lobbyist with the favored policy position never m mm  
exceeds the cap in equilibrium. From Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 in Appendix A, the upper bound
of the equilibrium distribution function of the favored lobbyist is:
 (5)
sup | | when Proposition 1( ) applies
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 
Solve for the lowest m where  is satisfied using equation (2) and Proposition 1:
sup
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  
     
The lobbyist with the favored policy alternative has a positive probability of exceeding the cap when
but he never exceeds the cap if   This results in a kink in the equilibrium distribution mm   . mm  
function of the unfavored lobbyist.
1112Note that when the penalty for exceeding the cap is sufficiently high  ,  is negative and m* is positive.   || / || u av   m
This implies that the favored lobbyist never exceeds the cap for these parameter values and it is only the unfavored lobbyist who is
directly affected by a relaxation in the contribution cap.  Probu then does not have a U shape as depicted in Figure 1. It is zero for
all m#m*  and it is an increasing function of m for all m>m*. 
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When  , it is only the lobbyist with the unfavored policy position who has a (, ) mm m  
positive probability of exceeding the cap. In this range of m, a less restrictive cap just decreases the
cost of the unfavored lobbyist and hence it makes him relatively more aggressive which leads to an
increase in the probability that the unfavored lobbyist wins, as can be seen in Figure 1. When  , mm  
in equilibrium both lobbyists have a positive probability of exceeding the cap. Since the unfavored
lobbyist must exceed his rival’s contribution by |γ| in order to win, he pays a higher expected cost of
exceeding the cap.  If the cap is relaxed both lobbyists pay less in expected cost of exceeding the cap.
But the reduction is a larger portion of the total contribution costs for the favored lobbyist. Hence,
when  , an increase in m leads to a decrease in the probability that the unfavored lobbyist wins. mm  
In Figure 1,  is also a local minimum for the expected total costs. When  , a less m mm  
restrictive cap leads to a reduction in the expected total cost, since in expectation the lobbyists pay
less extra cost for exceeding the cap. When  , a less restrictive cap gives a favorable tilt to the mm  
playing field for the unfavored lobbyist and this induces more aggressive bidding by the unfavored
lobbyist hence the expected aggregate costs increase.
12
  is the level of cap where the playing field is leveled,  . This critical value only m  || uf xx 
arises when   For all other values of γ, as the level of the cap changes,   12 12 () / ( 1 ) , . vv a vv    
the identity of the advantaged lobbyist A remains the same.
(7)





See Lemma  7 in Appendix A for the derivation of   At  the advantage in the game switches from . m  m 
one lobbyist to the other. In this range   when m# , f=A and Proposition   12 12 () / ( 1 ) , vv a vv     m 
1(i) describes the equilibrium distribution functions. The policy preference and the restrictive nature
of the contribution limit legislation yield a playing filed that is tilted in favor of the low-valuation
lobbyist whose policy position is favored. When m>,   u=A and Proposition 1(ii)  applies.  Due to m 
his higher valuation of the prize, the unfavored lobbyist can offset the disadvantage arising from the- 12 -
preference of the politician in an environment where the contribution cap is not too restrictive. At  , m 
the leveled playing field induces fierce competition and both lobbyists are most aggressive in their
contributions; E(Bids) are maximized.
also yields a kink in the graphs. When m<|γ| the unfavored bidder exceeds the cap for m  
all strictly positive bids in the support of his equilibrium strategy. However, when m>|γ| this is not
the case: The unfavored lobbyist has a kink in his cost function at m. This causes a kink in the
equilibrium distribution function of the favored lobbyist: max(0,m-|γ|)=0 when m>|γ|. In Figure 1 this
translates into a kink in the graphs at |γ|. 
III. Implications
In this section we present three main implications of the equilibrium which provide insight into the
effects of a contribution cap with monetary sanctions when the politician has a preference over policy
outcomes.
Result 1: A binding cap is never neutral on expected costs for . 0  
Proof: Appendix B.
In KW/GC a non-rigid cap with a monetary punishment is always neutral on expected costs.
The cap introduces a kink in the cost function of each lobbyist, but the effect of the kink is the same
for both of them. So rather than thinking of the lobbyists as choosing contributions it is possible to
simply think of them as choosing cost. The cap does not change their relative strengths in this
competition. Hence it has no effect on the competition in costs if the politician has no policy
preference.
However, when the politician has a policy preference, a contribution cap no longer effects the
two lobbyists in a symmetric fashion. The lobbyist with the unfavored policy must outbid the favored
lobbyist in order to overcome the policy preference. This means that any change in the level of the
cap will have different effects on the two lobbyists. In equilibrium the unfavored lobbyist exceeds
the cap for a greater portion of the range of his equilibrium strategy. Hence any change in the level13Campaign expenditures closely track total campaign contributions since only one percent of total expenditures are self
financed, Herrnson (2000).
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of m alters the lobbyists’ relative strength in the competition and therefore it changes the intensity
of the competition between them.
Result 2: When  there always exists a range of m where expected total costs and   12 0,vv  
expected total contributions strictly increase with a more restrictive contribution cap. This range is:
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      
Proof: Appendix B.
A more restrictive cap may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate contributions if
the politician mildly prefers the policy position of the low-valuation lobbyist and the cap is not too
restrictive to begin with. Hence we retrieve the original result of Che and Gale (1998) without the
use of non-monetary punishments. For the range of parameter values in Result 2 the politician prefers
the policy position of the low-valuation lobbyist, however the preference is not strong enough to
overcome bidder 1’s advantage arising from his higher valuation. Additionally for the range of m
given in Result 2,  so only the unfavored lobbyist has a positive probability of exceeding the mm  
cap in equilibrium. Therefore decreasing m directly affects the unfavored lobbyist but does not
directly affect the costs of the favored lobbyist. Since the unfavored lobbyist has the advantage in the
competition this results in a more level playing field and triggers more aggressive bidding by the
favored lobbyist resulting in higher aggregate contributions and cost.
The theory predicts that effect of the cap on aggregate contributions depends  on the
politician’s preference and the initial level of the cap. Indeed empirically the effect of a cap does
appear to depend on the environment. In gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 1997 Gross et al.
(2002) finds that more restrictive contribution limits result in increased incumbent spending.
13
However the opposite seems to be the case for state legislative offices. Hogan (2000) finds that the
incumbent spending goes down with stricter limits using data on state legislative candidates in mid-14Levitt (1995) points out that the amount spent on politics in the United States is roughly the same as the
amount spent on chewing gum. 
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1990s. Using data from 1980-2001, Stratmann (2006) and Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006)
exploit contribution limit variations across states and confirm that stricter restrictions tend to be
associated with lower campaign spending, in House and state Assembly elections, respectively.
One interpretation of the politician’s preference parameter*γ* is the expected future campaign
costs required to offset the effect of taking a policy position that is not popular with his constituents.
Under this interpretation, Result 2 suggests that the effect of a more restrictive contribution cap on
aggregate contributions may be quite different for House members versus Senators, as well as for
members from cities versus members from rural areas. Between congressional districts there are vast
differences in the cost of communicating with constituents even though they represent the same
number of voters. Stratmann (2009) finds that the cost of reaching 1% of constituents with TV
advertising during prime time in the 2000 election cycle ranged from $18 in Idaho’s 2
nd district to
$1875 in New York City.
Since a politician from a smaller or a more rural district is likely to face a lower cost of
communicating with constituents, with the same underlying policy preference the *γ* for this
politician is likely to be lower. Result 2 implies that the politician whose preference is mild enough
such that  may see increased contributions as a result of the cap, while the politician   12 0,vv  
with higher γ will see decreased contributions. So the cap on contributions may change the
distribution of contributions between politicians. It may result in reduced contributions to Senators
from larger states but increased contributions to Representatives from districts contained within
minor media markets. When states consider contribution caps for state level offices, the experience
with national level contribution caps may not directly apply to state politicians who generally have
much lower costs of communicating with constituents.
So far the literature on the effect of caps on competition for political favors uses the amount
of money in politics as the primary metric for the evaluation of campaign finance legislation.
However the concern of the legislation is not that political contributions are an onerous burden on
society,
14 but rather that they may alter the behavior of the agents involved. Hence we suggest an
additional measure for the degree of influence of money on policy: The equilibrium probability that- 15 -
political contributions induce the politician to make a policy choice that he would not have made in
the absence of contributions, the probability that the unfavored policy is enacted Probu . Note that this
measure of the degree of influence of monied interests has an advantage over using expected
aggregate contributions because it captures the concern that policy may be driven by money. The
choice of measure matters. A more restrictive cap may lead to increased aggregate contributions
while at the same time reducing the probability that the politician enacts the unfavored policy (see
Figure 1).  
Result 3: For any    0,  
(i) Any binding contribution cap reduces the influence of money on policy outcomes
compared with no cap on contributions.
(ii) The influence of money on policy outcomes is minimized with a binding but strictly
positive contribution cap whenever a ban on contributions does not fully suppress all
competition, .  (1 ) u va  
Proof: Appendix B.
Figure 1 gives the probability that the unfavored policy is enacted as a function of m. While
the graph is for a particular range of politician preference, as long as a complete ban on contributions
does not fully suppress all competition, m*<0, Probu has a similar U-shape, and the probability that
the politician goes against his policy preference is minimized at m".
While in equilibrium both lobbyists have a positive probability of exceeding the cap when
the cap is very restrictive, m<m", it is only the lobbyist with the unfavored policy who might violate
the cap when the cap is higher than m". When the cap restricts both competitors, a relaxation in the
cap lowers both of their costs but the reduction in cost is proportionally larger for the favored lobbyist
since his rival must exceed his contribution by   in order to win. This leads to an increase in the 
probability that the lobbyist with the favored policy wins. When a less restrictive cap directly reduces
the cost of only the unfavored lobbyist, m>m", it leads to an increase in the unfavored lobbyist’s
probability of winning.  Hence for all parameter values where m*<0, a complete ban on contributions
leads to higher influence of money on policy compared to a strictly positive binding cap of m".
The stated aim of the current legislation limiting campaign contributions is the “reduction of
special interest influence.” This goal may or may not be desirable, but one reasonable interpretation- 16 -
of it is an attempt to reduce the probability that the politician enacts policy against his policy
preference (either ideologically motivated or induced by his constituents), Probu. In practice however
it is difficult to determine the level of the cap that minimizes the influence of money on policy
outcomes. An incumbent politician is likely to have different degrees of preference across different
policy issues. The valuation of the political prize to the interest groups varies depending on the policy
area. Hence the legislated cap may not be able to minimize the influence of campaign contributions
for all policy issues at once. However irrespective of the  degree of politician preference, Result 3
shows that any binding contribution cap leads to a weaker influence of money on policy compared
with no cap on contributions.








m#m*, lobbyists do not contribute and the politician simply goes with his preference. Therefore a
more restrictive cap implies a lower critical threshold of preference where there will be no influence
of special interest groups on policy making. Hence politician decisions will be swayed by monied
interests on a smaller number of questions.
IV. Conclusion
If the politician does not have a preference over different policy alternatives, Kaplan and Wettstein
(2006) and Gale and Che ( 2006) find that a contribution cap is neutral on the expected total cost of
lobbying and on the policy outcome as long as violations of contribution cap legislation are punished
via monetary fines. We find that these neutrality results do not hold if the politician has a policy
preference either based on ideology or derived from constituent preferences. A non-rigid cap with
monetary punishments has an asymmetric effect on the lobbyists even if the cost functions are
identical. The lobbyist with the unfavored policy is hit more heavily by the cap since he needs to
contribute more than his rival in order to overcome the politician’s preference. Furthermore a more
restrictive cap can lead to fiercer competition and higher expected aggregate contributions and cost
of contributions. Hence we retrieve the Che and Gale (1998) result without resorting to non-
monetary punishments or asymmetric cost functions.
Analyzing politicians with policy preferences permits the analysis of an additional measure
for the degree of influence of money on policy: The equilibrium probability that the politician makes15In order to disentangle the electoral motive from buying policy favors motive of contributions and to establish clear
causality between money and voting behavior, Stratmann (2002) examines repeated votes on the same piece of legislation: the repeal
of provisions of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. The act prohibited bank holding companies from owning other financial services
companies. The repeal was rejected by the House in 1991, and it then passed in 1998. It was strongly favored by banking interests
but also strongly opposed by insurance and securities interests. Stratmann finds that an extra $10,000 in contributions was associated
with an 8% increase in the probability of a House member voting to repeal the prohibition. 
16Lohmann (1995) points out that caps on political contributions may be counterproductive because when contributions
serve as an access fee they may signal the credibility of the message.
17These of course include races with just a token challenger. Candidates for open seats, which generally include serious
challengers, raised an average of $2.8 million, substantially below the amount the average incumbent was able to raise. The figures
for House races are similar, although the amounts are lower. The average incumbent raised $1.2 million, while the average challenger
raised $283 thousand. Candidates for open seats raised an average of $584 thousand.
- 17 -
a policy choice that he would not have made in the absence of political contributions. The penalty
for exceeding the cap may be not large enough so that a ban on contributions can fully suppress all
contributions. If this is the case, a complete ban on contributions will result in a higher degree of
influence of money on policy than a binding but non-zero cap. 
It may be not possible to set a cap that minimizes“special interest influence” across all policy
issues because the incumbent politician is likely to have different degrees of preference across issues
and the valuation of the political prize will vary for the lobbyists. However Result 3(ii) shows that
any binding contribution cap will reduce the influence of money on policy making compared with
no cap on contributions. Hence while a cap may increase the total expected contributions, it will
always decrease the influence of political contributions on policy outcomes. 
However note that this paper focuses solely on the effect of contribution caps on competition
for political favors. Austen-Smith (1998) analyzes the effect of caps on the incentives incumbent
politicians face when deciding whether to grant access to lobbyists. While the results of both papers
are encouraging for the efficacy of contribution caps, in a broader context the effect of contribution
caps on electoral outcome may be perverse.
15 Caps may be imposed by incumbents as entry barriers
to challengers in guise of promoting clean government. Challengers may be deterred from entry due
to heavy filling requirements. And/or caps may make it harder to overcome the incumbent’s
advantage of already being well-known.
16
On the other hand, the ability to raise funds is much greater for incumbents than for
challengers. In the 2006 elections the average incumbent senator raised $11.3 million, while the
average challenger raised $1.8 million.
17 A contribution to buy policy favors or access is only of18For comparison, if these percentages stayed constant and equal for all members and there were no voluntary retirements
or deaths, the expected time in office would be roughly 43 years for Senators and 50 years for Representatives.
- 18 -
potential value if the politician is in office to pay back. Over the five election cycles from 1996 to
2004 96.8% of House incumbents and 88% of the Senate incumbents were returned to office.
18
Hence restricting the ability to raise funds may hurt the incumbent at least as much as it hurts his
challenger. However the evidence is mixed on the question of who enjoys the benefit of a cap.
Hamm and Hogan (2008) finds that restrictions make the prospects of running against an incumbent
more attractive to potential candidates. La Raja (2008) however reports that the financial gap
widened in congressional races since BCRA. Incumbent fund-raising increased 20% between 2002
and 2006. But the challengers’ did not. Stratmann et al.(2006) report that limits lead to closer
elections but the effect is smaller on incumbents who passed the law.
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APPENDIX A: Proof of Proposition 1
Equilibrium when γ =0 is shown in KW. When γ#-v2, γ$v1 or m#m* equilibrium is in pure strategies
with neither lobbyist contributing and the prize being awarded to the lobbyist with the favored
policy. Hence in what follows we restrict attention to m>m* and   Define for    21 ,0 0, . vv   
each bidder a function Wi(x) giving the bid that he must place to effectively match a bid of x from
his rival.  So  and  W( ) uf f xx   W( ) . fu u xx  
Lemma 1: Bidder u will put zero probability on . (0, ] i x  19Siegel (2009) could be used to directly establish the expected values. However since this game is not generic for all sets
of parameter values Theorem 1 does not apply and only the weaker Corollary 2 can be used. Hence it would not be possible to
establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution functions using that approach.
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Proof:  If bidder u contemplates  a bid of zero will win with the same probability as he (0, ) u x  
must exceed his rival’s bid by at least   in order to win. If   then he can win only if the other  u x  
bidder bids zero, in which case there is an even chance of winning. So if that bid gave him a
nonnegative payoff he could double his chances of winning by a slight increase in his bid. And if
it gave him a negative payoff he could get a zero payoff by dropping his bid to zero.
~
Lemma 2: Neither bidder will put any probability mass point on any bid greater than zero.
Proof: Suppose u had a mass point at   Then bidder f would not put any probability at
* . u x  
either a slight increase in his bid would result in a discrete increase in the probability
* || , fu xx   
of winning if  , or  in which case bidder f would not put any probability at since f f x x   f f x x   f x 
by definition it would be worth bidding  only if a win is certain. As there is no probability of f x 
 bidder u could lower his bid slightly without changing his probability of winning.
'* || , fu xx 
A similar argument rules out mass points for bidder f on  ~ 0. f x 
Lemma 3: Neither bidder will use a pure strategy. 
Proof: Lemma 2 rules out any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where any bid is greater than zero.
Both players’ bidding zero cannot be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium either, since the best
response to xf=0 would be for u to bid slightly higher than |γ| in which case it would be not optimal
for f to bid zero. ~
Lemma 4: Bidder D has an infimum bid of zero. The expected value of the game to bidder D is
zero.
19
Proof:  Bidder D’s infimum bid must be less than vD since there can be no probability mass at vD by
Lemma 2.  Suppose that bidder D has an infimum bid of   such that   In that case
inf 0 D x 
inf W( ) 0 . AD x 
bidder A would never bid    If he did he would be paying a positive amount and would lose
inf W( ) . AD x
for sure, since by Lemma 2, the probability of bidder D choosing exactly  is zero in this range.
inf
D x
Therefore bidder D could lower his infimum bid without changing the probability of winning. If
bidder  D is bidder f, then this implies directly that  is not possible since
inf 0 D x 
 However, if bidder D is bidder u, then   So,
inf inf W( ) | | 0 . AD D xx  
inf inf W( ) . AD D xx  
inf inf
D W( ) 0  f o r  x | | . AD x  
Suppose that bidder D is bidder u and   where bidder u was mixing in the open
inf
u b  
interval above |γ| but not at |γ|, by Lemma 1. Then bidder f would never bid zero as this gives zero
profit and he can win for sure with a bid of    yielding a positive profit. Take a bid of W( ) f u x- 21 -
 the probability that bidder u wins with this bid is  Since





bidder f has no mass points on (0, ε] by Lemma 2, this probability is close to zero for small ε,
yielding a negative expected payoff for bidder u. Hence bidder u’s infimum bid cannot be |γ|.
 is not possible by Lemma 1.  Therefore a bid of zero is in the support of the mixed
inf (0, ) i b  
strategy of bidder u.
Therefore a bid of zero is in the support of the mixed strategy of bidder D.  At this bid he
loses for sure, so the expected value of the strategy for bidder D must be zero. ~
Lemma 5: Bidder D has a suprimum bid of   Bidder A has a suprimum bid of
sup . D D x x 
 The expected value of the game to bidder A is   with equality only
sup W( ) . AA D x x    cW( ) 0 , AA D vx  
if bidder u is the advantaged bidder A and  . AD xx 
Proof: Bidder D cannot have suprimum bid of zero since that would be a pure strategy which
contradicts Lemma 3. Suppose that bidder D has a suprimum bid of    Then bidder A
sup (0, ). DD x x 
would never set   as he can win for sure with   since by Lemma 2 the
sup W( ) AA D x x 
sup W( ) AA D x x 




DD xx  
yielding a payoff greater than zero for small enough ε, a contradiction of Lemma 4.
Suppose that bidder A has a suprimum bid of   Then bidder D could lower his
sup W( ) . AA D x x 
suprimum bid and still win for sure with that bid yielding a payoff greater than zero for small
enough ε, a contradiction of Lemma 4.  Bidder A can win for sure with a bid of  since by W( ) AD x
Lemma 2 the probability of bidder u choosing exactly   is zero.  Since  is in the support D x W( ) AD x
of his mixed strategy and he wins for sure with that bid, the expected payoff for bidder A is
  cW( ). AA D vx 
If bidder f is the advantaged bidder A, then   and the definition of the W( ) AD D xx   
advantaged bidder yields   and so the expected payoff of bidder A is strictly positive. AD xx 
If bidder u is the advantaged bidder A, then  and the definition of the advantaged W( ) AD D xx   
bidder yields   so the expected payoff of bidder A is strictly positive unless AD xx 
  in which case it is zero.  ~ AD xx 
Lemma 6: For bidder f, bids almost everywhere on and for bidder u, bids almost
sup [0, ] ff x x 
everywhere on   must have positive probability.
sup (, ] , uu xx  
Proof: Suppose there were an interval (t, s) in   where bidder u had zero probability of
sup (, ] u x 
bidding. Then bidder f would have zero probability of bidding in (t-|γ|, s-|γ|) since he could lower
his bid to t-|γ| and have the same chance of winning. But in this case bidder u would never bid  s  
as he could lower his bid to t, saving  in bidding costs and losing only  st    F( ) F( ) ff st     
in probability.  By Lemma 2 the loss in probability is negligible for small  So if there is an interval . 
of zero probability it must go up to   which contradicts Lemma 5.  A symmetric argument rules
sup
u x
out ranges of zero probability for bidder f in  ~
sup [0, ]. ff xx - 22 -






       . uf xx  








      




  uf xx  
is lower .
Proof: Consider first γ<0. Then f is bidder 1 and u is bidder 2. If m$v1 then   If 11 22 and . x vx v 
v2<m<v1 then   If m#v2 then   For all ranges
1

















of m,   Hence     12 . x x  0. uf xx   
Now consider γ>v1-v2, a positive γ implies f=2 and u=1. Hence if m$v2,    and 2 f x v 






























Finally consider   Again f=2 and u=1.  Hence if m$v1, a n d   12 0, . vv   2 f x v 





































































 m$v2 and so  ~ . uf xx  
Lemma 8: The unique equilibrium distribution functions are those given in Proposition 1.
Proof: Part (i):  By lemma 7,   In this case the favored bidder f is also the advantaged . fu xx 
bidder  A.  By lemmas 5 and 6 all bids xf  0   must yield an expected payoff of 0,W ( ) fu x    
 to bidder f.  By lemma 2 in this range there is zero probability that  cW( ) ff u vx  . uf xx 
So bidder f wins if    Therefore on that  range: . fu xx 
  cW( ) F ( ) c () ff u f u vx v x x    




F( ) f o r  x 0 ,m i n ,
c




vx x m x
vx




         
       
letting   and solving for Fu(@): u xx  - 23 -
 

for   ,min ,
F( )
() ( 1 )



















   
 
       

Bidder u places no probability on  by lemma 1 so plugging in  at the bottom of the range 0,    
yields the probability mass at zero.
By lemmas 4, 5 and 6 all bids in   yield an expected payoff of zero to bidder u. By  , u x   
lemma 2 in this range there is zero probability that  so bidder u wins if  fu xx   . uf xx 
Therefore on that  range:
0F ( ) c ( ) uf vx x   
So from equation 1
      F( ) f o r  , m i n ,
0
F ( ) (1 ) for [ , )
uf u
uf u
vx x x m x
vx a x a m x m x


     
     
letting   and solving for Ff(@): f xx  
 

for 0,min max(0, ),
F( )























         
plugging in zero at the bottom of the range yields the probability mass at zero. 
Part (ii): By lemma 7,     In this case the unfavored bidder u is the advantaged bidder . uf xx 
A.  By lemmas 4 and 6 all bids in   must yield an expected payoff of zero to bidder f.   By 0, f x  
lemma 2 in this range there is zero probability that  . So bidder f wins if  uf xx   . fu xx 
Therefore on that  range:
0F ( ) c ( ) fu vx x   
So from equation 1:
     

F( ) f o r  x 0 ,m i n ,
0
F( ) ( 1 ) f o r  ,
fu f
fu f
vx x m x
vx a x a m x m x


       
      
letting   and solving for Fu(@): u xx  
 

for   ,min ,
F( )
(1 ) (1 )



















     
  
        

Bidder u places no probability on   by lemma 1 so plugging in  at the bottom of the range 0,    
yields the probability mass at zero.
By lemmas 4, 5 and 6 all bids in   yield an expected payoff of   ,W ( ) uf x      cW( ) uu f vx 
to bidder u.  By lemma 2 in this range there is zero probability that   so bidder u wins fu xx  
if   Therefore on that  range: . uf xx - 24 -
 cW( ) F( ) c () uu f u f vx v xx    
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   

plugging in zero at the bottom of the range yields the probability mass at zero. ~
Lemma 9: The equilibrium distributions, and hence all comparative statics, are continuous in m.
Proof: The distributions in each part of Proposition 1 are clearly continuous in m.  When








      
(ii) at    However at that point the distributions are identical. If







 then all competition is curtailed at    At that point the /, u av      *( 1) / . u ma v a      
favored bidder is advantaged so the distribution of Proposition 1 (i) applies and it results in no
competition between the bidders.  The implication of Lemma 9 is that making a cap more restrictive
will never result in a discontinuous jump in the expected bids as it does in CG.
~
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B: Proof of Results
The results follow directly from Proposition 1. First we show how to use the relative levels of the
critical values of m to determine the min and max arguments in the equilibrium distribution
functions in Proposition 1. It is then straightforward to calculate Probu, E(Bids) and E(Costs) from
the equilibrium distribution functions in Proposition 1:
(| | ) ( ) uf u
u
Prob F x f x dx   
() ( ) ( ) uf
uf
E Bids xf xd x x f xd x  - 25 -
sup sup
sup sup min( , ) min( , )






EC o s t s EB i d s ax mf xd x ax mf xd x     
Table 1 presents comparative statics for these measures for each of the possibilities for m relative
to the critical values of m for   This information is then used to prove the  max(0, *), . mm m 
results.
Determining the min max arguments in Proposition 1: 
This is considered in two parts corresponding to the two parts of Proposition 1. For all distribution
functions, note that max(0, m-|γ|)=0 if m<|γ|.
i)When Proposition 1(i) applies and  the ranges in the favored lobbyist’s
* mm m  
distribution function depend on whether or not  : m  
if m#|γ|, min(max(0, | |), | |) 0 u mx   
if m>|γ|, m i n ( m a x ( 0 , || ) , || ) || u mx m     
while the ranges in the unfavored lobbyist’s distribution function depend on whether or not  : mm  
if  ,m i n ( | | , ) | | u mm m x m      
if  ,m i n ( | | , ) uu mm m x x    
When Proposition 1 applies,  and . (1 ) u mv a      /( 1 ) uu x va m a  
(ii) When Proposition 1(ii) applies, and   the ranges in the favored lobbyist’s
* mm m  
distribution function depend on whether or not  : m  
if m#|γ|, min(max(0, | |), ) 0 f mx   
if m>|γ|, min(max(0, | |), ) | | f mx m    
while the ranges in the unfavored lobbyist’s distribution function depend on whether or not  : mm  
    if , min( | |, | |) | | f mm m x m       
if , min( | |, ) | | ff mm m x x       
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Table 1: Comparative Statics when    *, mm m 
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Proposition 1(ii) applies and:














   







VI m<|γ| and mm   0 0 a  0
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Proof of Result 1: From Table 1   and   changes in m     21 ,0 0, vv     max(0, *), mm m 
are never neutral on expected costs. ~






     








      
. mm   2 mv   mm   
 So in either case   so Table 1 row VIII yields the result. 12 () / ( 1 ) . vv a    max( , ) mm   
~
Proof of Result 3: When   from (3) m*<0 and from (4) and (6)   From (1 ) u va   (0, ). mm  
Proposition 1, Probu is continuous in m and Table 1 shows that Probu is U-shaped: Decreasing in m
for all   and increasing in m for all  This completes the proof of part (ii). It (0, ) mm   (, ) . mm m  
also shows that whenever  m*<0 then Probu will be maximized at one of the endpoints, either m=0
or  . mm 
If   then   m*$0 is not possible so from (4) and (6) whenever m*$0,   12 0, / (1 ) vv a     
 Hence   and thus Table 1 shows that Probu is weakly (1 ) 0. u mv a       (* ,) mm m mm   
increasing in m over this entire range. Moreover (4) implies that   so range VI in Table 1 m  
(where there is no effect of changes in m on Probu) must be strictly below  Thus if m*$0 any level . m
of cap  will reduce Probu compared to no contribution cap. mm 
It only remains to show that when m*<0 the level of Probu is weakly lower at  m=0 than at  . mm 
Without a cap, when  then Proposition 1 part (i) applies and,     21 2 1 ,0 , vv v v    
(8) 
22 1




Prob F x f x dx v
vv
     








      
(9)
22 2 1




Prob F x f x dx v a
vv
          
which is strictly less than (8) and so part (i) holds when   When     21 2 1 ,0 , . vv v v    
 and there is no cap then Proposition 1 part (ii) applies and   12 0,vv  






Prob F x f x dx
v
    








      
 so part (i) holds for this range of γ. Finally, when m=0 and  12 /( 1 ) vv a   
 then Proposition 1 part (ii) applies  so    12 0, / (1 ) vv a     
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v
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which is equal to (10) so for this final range of γ part (ii) holds weakly for a complete ban on
contributions and holds strictly for any  ~ (0, ). m  